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  Two perspectives: Gulliver’s Travels 
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2) Lilliput: Political Community 
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3) Compositional effects  
 Small and big cities are 
“inhabited by different kinds of 
people”.  
 In order to isolate the effects of 
size we must “separate out the 
effects of the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the individual 
living in the communities”.    
 (Verba et al. 1978:273) 
The proof of the pudding …  
Theory: three answers to 
question about democratic 
effects of municipal size 
All three have a degree of 
plausibility. Which answer is 
correct?  
Need for empirical evidence 
(Proof of the pudding is in the eating!) 
 
Stage 1: 
secondary 
analysis of 
existing data; 
G&P issue 2002 
 
 
 
Stage 2: 
collection of 
new data in four 
countries:                 
CH, NO, DK & 
NL 
Special issue: Environment 
and Planning C: Government 
and Policy vol. 20; 2002 
Size & Local Democracy in Europe 
a) Inputs:  
citizens’ interest, 
knowledge and 
participation 
b) Throughput: 
citizens’ 
confidence in 
politicians  
c) Outputs: 
citizens’ 
satisfaction with 
performance 
Three sets of criteria in SLDE 
Ten criteria based on 
citizens’ orientations and 
involvement in local 
democracy 
  
Level 1: Four countries  
 Wide variation in average size 
 Similar local government systems; but 
important differences remain (e.g. 
direct democracy) 
 
Level 2: 50-60 municipalities per country 
 Selection: maximize variation in size 
 
Level 3: 30 respondents per municipality 
 Selection: random sampling  
Three levels of analysis 
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S  MLA: stepwise analysis 
1) Bivariate correlation 
Size Party activism 
Backgrounds 
2) Total effect (minus compositional effect, model 3)  
Size Party activism 
S 3) Total Effect = Direct + Indirect  
Size Party activism 
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Findings: size effects 
Negative size effect in three or four 
countries   
Negative size effect in two countries 
• Personal political competence 
• Satisfaction with local government 
• Party activism 
• Local contacting 
• Confidence in local politicians  
• Distinctiveness of local voting 
Negative size effect in 
three or four countries   
Negative size effect in two 
countries 
• Personal political 
competence 
• Party activism 
• Local contacting 
• Satisfaction with local 
government 
• Confidence in local 
politicians  
• Distinctiveness of local 
voting 
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Size effect on contacting 
Negative size effect in three or four 
countries   
Negative size effect in two countries 
• Personal political competence 
• Satisfaction with local government 
• Party activism 
• Local contacting 
• Confidence in local politicians  
• Distinctiveness of local voting 
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Size effect on satisfaction 
Negative size effect in three or four 
countries   
Negative size effect in two countries 
• Personal political competence 
• Satisfaction with local government 
• Party activism 
• Local contacting 
• Confidence in local politicians  
• Distinctiveness of local voting 
Our final word on the matter!   
No evidence for  compositional effects 
 
Weak corroboration for Lilliput thesis 
 6 (more or less) consistent 
significant negative effects  
 Effects may be rather weak 
 Size Matters …. A little bit!  
 
Strong refutation of Brobdingnag thesis 
 0 (more or less) consistent positive 
effects 
 
 
 
Reformers: “Brobdingnag not that ugly !”  
 Scale increases not so 
disadvantageous as often claimed!  
 More professionalism & specialisation 
and more legal quality; performance 
gains 
 
 Other research: no conclusive evidence 
for systematic positive scale 
 Amalgamation reforms are costly: direct 
costs and opportunity costs 
 Our research: if there are advantages, 
citizens are not appreciative of these  
 
